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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Mark Marszalek (93A 7995) 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
57 Sanitorium Road, Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 
Otisville CF 
10-052-18 B 
Decision appealed. Septembei 2018 deeision, denying discretionary release anel-imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
B9ard Member(s) Berliner, Drake, Davis. 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant'sBriefreceived October 11, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Re.cords relie-0 upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
-6f med _· _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to 
·"'·' ----
/ _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to 
__...'----'--"""'11-.._=-.--Affi.rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
~easons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination. the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separat~ f~ding~ of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's· Counsel, if any, on J /6 /ltf /d . 
/ 7 
D1stribtliiil11: ,-\pfK'<.ll~ 1 'nit - Appclhrn1 - Appdlant"s Coun:\d - lnsr. Parok Vile - Central Fik 
P-2002fH) r. l t /2018) 
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Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. 
 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and made in violation of applicable legal authority; (2) the Board did not properly 
consider Appellant’s COMPAS instrument when making its determination; and (3) Appellant did 
express remorse and insight relative to his crime of conviction.  
 
As to the first issue, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-
74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 
N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
 
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely 
within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 
N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; 
Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 
(1st Dept. 1997).   
 
In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
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Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
As to the second issue, in 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a). The Board satisfies this requirement in part 
by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 
N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 
1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 
1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not 
eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by 
considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not 
change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether 
to grant parole. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot 
mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d 
Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along 
with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. 
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  
Additionally, even certain low COMPAS scores would not have placed the onus on the Board to 
provide countervailing evidence to support its determination.  The 2011 amendments require the 
Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s 
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute 
thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs 
assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide countervailing 
evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to 
satisfy the first prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law,” the Board could also find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society, or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. 
The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS 
scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. 
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 As to the third issue, it is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider Appellant’s 
remorse and insight relative to his crime of conviction. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 
997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 
164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited insight and 
remorse); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 
275 (2d Dept. 2002) (limited insight into why crime committed).  Insight and remorse are relevant 
not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the 
offense.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 
2007).  Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
